moonshot

BUILDING RESILIENCE

TO MISINFORMATION

IN EUROPE

10 YEARS
OF
ONLINE
SAFETY
MOONSHOTTEAM.COM

Executive summary

In May 2024, Moonshot, Google and Jigsaw launched an EU-wide initiative to help individuals spot online misinformation tactics and boost media literacy. It was part of a broader effort by Google to support the integrity of European parliamentary elections on 6-9 June. This report details how we used short videos on major platforms to empower viewers to investigate what they see online, think critically, and resist manipulation.

Together with civil society partners from across the region, we used a communications technique called "prebunking" to help individuals spot and reject future attempts to manipulate them. We did this because prebunking has demonstrated promise as a scalable approach to preempting misinformation - especially when short videos are used to preempt common rhetorical techniques (Roozenbeek et. al. 2022).

We sought to equip voters with an understanding of how to spot and reject the most frequently used manipulation techniques in the dynamic period before, during, and just after elections. The foundation of this initiative was an analysis of the online misinformation landscape across the EU. Moonshot and European academic experts used qualitative and quantitative research methods to identify three common tactics used to spread misinformation narratives online during EU elections.

- ∑ **Scapegoating:** Singling out individuals, groups, or entities and blaming them for complex societal problems or specific issues.

- ∑ **Decontextualization:** The practice of taking information out of its original context to create a false or misleading narrative, including the use of AI-generated content without context.

- ∑ **Discrediting:** Making false or misleading statements about a person, group or institution to damage their reputation.

With global creative agency Toaster, we produced a series of short animated videos. The videos did not reference elections, and focused on explaining each of these tactics, with the goal of equipping European voters to spot misinformation and stop its spread.

We disseminated the videos using a paid ad campaign around the 2024 EU elections (held 6-9 June). The videos ran from 15 May - 19 June on Youtube, Facebook and Instagram. Videos were created in 24 EU languages as well as Russian, Arabic and Turkish, and amplified with paid ads in five countries: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Poland.

Our campaign was supported by a broad coalition of policy and civil society partners across Europe. They assisted with research, creative reviews, branding, online and offline distribution, and bringing together media literacy resources to empower EU voters and build trust in reliable information around June's elections.

Partners included: Libraries without Borders, Debating Europe and BBC Media Action for our EU-wide campaigns; AFP, Conspiracy Watch, Génération Numérique, Mouvement Européen France, and Square in France; Alfred Landecker Stiftung, Das Nettz, German Dream, Klicksafe, and Neue deutsche Medienmacher:innen in Germany; the Italian Digital Media Observatory in Italy; and Demagog in Poland. As part of a wider effort to promote wider media literacy and fact checking during the campaign, Google also joined forces with the European Parliament, the European Fact Checking Standards Network, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA).

Results

We helped over 1.5 million EU voters recognize online manipulation techniques and improved the quality of information people intended to share in the critical periods before, during, and after EU elections.

The prebunking videos reached over 120 million people on YouTube, Facebook and Instagram. This was the world's largest prebunking initiative to date.

At least 1.5 million viewers improved their ability to recognize common manipulation tactics.

Over 1 million people visited our [prebunking webpage](#) to access additional educational and media literacy content from fact checkers, the European Parliament, and media and civil society partners. We also promoted media literacy resources and initiatives from Google, including tips on tracing online claims, quotes and media; how to check facts and sources using public Search features; and YouTube's [Hit Pause](#) campaign.

Impact varied across countries due to a variety of factors including educational attainment, digital literacy, geography and GDP.

Results demonstrate that prebunking can boost resilience to manipulation at scale. Following the campaign, a quantitative study of our prebunking videos in 12 EU countries showed that viewers' detection of manipulation techniques improved, as did their ability to discern between manipulative and non-manipulative content.

What is prebunking?

Prebunking is a communication technique that builds resilience to future manipulation. It teaches individuals to spot and refute a misleading argument or narrative before interacting with it online.

Prebunking typically contains three components that work in conjunction: a forewarning (e.g. "you could be manipulated"), a refutation of a specific misinformation technique (e.g. a definition of scapegoating and how to resist it), and a stimulus or "microdose" of this misleading technique or narrative (e.g. a contextual example of scapegoating).


Forewarning
Users are alerted that there are impending "attacks" to manipulate them.

Stimulus
Users see example(s) of manipulative messaging to identify it in the future.

Refutation
Users are equipped to spot and refute a manipulative message.

Prebunking seeks to empower individuals to make informed decisions, and assumes no prior capabilities or knowledge of a topic - making it widely usable across age groups, topics and settings. It can resonate with a wide audience when messages are educational, non-judgmental, and non-accusatory. The approach focuses on *how* people are commonly manipulated and misled online, rather than directly challenging falsehoods, or telling people what they need to believe.

The Jigsaw team at Google worked with academics and researchers in the UK and US to build on decades of academic research and pioneer video-based prebunking to address online manipulation.[1] Over the past two years, Moonshot, Google and Jigsaw developed four sets of prebunking videos, all of which helped individuals improve their ability to detect online manipulation techniques.

Prebunking videos generally improve viewers' ability to identify manipulation by up to 15%. More information on prebunking can be found at prebunking.withgoogle.com

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1.   For more information, visit inoculation.science/inoculation-videos/ and science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abo6254

Past prebunking campaigns

Prebunking misinformation tactics in Germany
June - August 2023

Videos educated Germans aged 18-55 about common manipulation tactics: decontextualization, whataboutism and fearmongering. We avoided narratives that could increase social polarization, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, energy or COVID-19.

[Decontextualization video](#)

Prebunking to support fair elections in Indonesia
November - December 2023

Videos educated 18-34 year olds in Java about manipulation tactics ahead of Indonesia's 2024 Presidential election. We highlighted three tactics - discrediting, decontextualization and emotional manipulation - using a gameshow format and local influencers.

[Decontextualization video](#)

Research

Our approach was informed by recent academic literature on misinformation in the EU, 12 interviews with European experts, and lessons from previous efforts in [Germany](#), [Central and Eastern Europe](#), and [Indonesia](#).

Moonshot's analysis found that mis- and disinformation narratives around elections often target governments and democratic institutions, science and health regulations, and European social and economic security. Many narratives exploit citizens' uncertainty about a given topic, erode confidence in scientific consensus, or capitalize on news events to breed strife or suspicion within communities.

Expert quote

"One of the best examples of disinformation campaigns we've seen appeared the day before the election. [...] that kind of vacuum creates a situation where a lot of misinformation can spread [...] [for example] out-of-context videos about a hand recount. Users would certainly benefit from having some prebunking before the election on this, because it's fertile ground and voters need more information [...] 40% of the top [misinformation] content we see online before elections might be this."

- Disinformation policy expert and fact checker, Spain

Our initiative focused on educating the public about manipulation tactics used frequently in election misinformation, rather than specific narratives or issues. We did so to make the videos relevant to an EU-wide audience, and foster independent critical thinking, rather than arbitrate on sensitive or political topics. Focusing on these common manipulation tactics also enabled scalability, as the same tactics are reused across time, language, geography, and topics to mislead and misinform.[2]

Selecting our target audience: EU citizens aged 45+

Expert interviews and [academic literature](#) confirmed that *all* Europeans are susceptible to misinformation to some degree. However, [research also suggests](#) that lower digital literacy - which decreases with age - is correlated with higher susceptibility to misinformation. We therefore determined that a focus on older voters, aged 45 and above, could address these critical gaps in misinformation resilience and media literacy.

These gaps can have a disproportionate impact on the spread of misinformation during elections, given the [relatively higher voter](#) turnout by older demographic groups. This group is also harder to reach at scale, in comparison to, for example, media literacy programs for young people in full-time education.

Creative strategy

A creative agency, Toaster, developed an animation concept called "Tactic Detective" to encourage our audience to spot manipulative 'clues' online, and tap into the popularity of crime genre storytelling. This creative strategy balanced a crisp, scientifically-grounded message encouraging viewers to think critically with a playful, entertaining medium that held their attention.

Like a detective piecing together evidence at a crime scene, our videos follow a protagonist as she taps into her inner sleuth and spots the telltale signs of misinformation in everyday scenes.

Using classic tropes of detective fiction, they reveal how we can be misled by false information and ignore conflicting evidence. Through storytelling, the detective becomes a role model for overcoming misleading information with critical thinking, and demonstrates the value of questioning our immediate reactions to what we see online.


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
2. [Hassoun and colleagues (2024)](#) analyzed the impact of election and medical misinformation sharing in Brazil and the United States where they found a proliferation of misleading, non-falsifiable content. They underscore the finding that misinformation is difficult to falsify when it is combined with true or expert information to create "misleading content," which may not be strictly true or false, but is typically manipulative. By drawing attention to specific manipulation techniques, prebunking can avoid the challenge posed by such "gray area" misleading content - which is difficult to disprove, detect and moderate.

We created [three 50-second videos](#), and in Germany, France, and Italy, we also produced three 20-second "booster" videos that included a brief warning about online manipulation and a tactic definition. We were able to run the shorter booster videos as non-skippable YouTube ads. This allowed us to increase the number of viewers exposed to the campaign message, and compare engagement across different video lengths.

In addition to the three videos, we created a landing page to host resources from our broader coalition of European partners, which included civil society, institutions promoting voter information, and media organizations. The aim was to signpost tools to help people investigate what they see online. The resources were made available in 27 languages.

Partner organizations shared strategic goals, and came together to help us bring new audiences to the prebunking content. Some co-branded the videos; provided media literacy resources, and helped distribute and promote the campaigns. Others advised on video content, and provided expert perspectives during the research phase. Google worked with both EU-wide and member state partners to extend the reach and impact of this initiative.

Our campaign website also highlighted relevant media literacy resources and initiatives by Google and YouTube, including ways to check facts and sources using public [Search features](#), and YouTube's [Hit Pause](#) campaign. These complimented the prebunking campaign by giving our audience tools to quickly evaluate information, and gather context on information they encounter online.

The campaign landing page in English, featuring the prebunking videos and resources from our EU partners, Google, and YouTube.

Results

Our ads reached over 120 million people across five EU countries. It was the world's largest known prebunking initiative to date, and designed to meet the potential scale of misinformation facing voters during the 2024 EU elections.

Videos reached 100% of our target audience on YouTube (platform users aged 45 and above) in all markets where we ran ads.[3] Over one million viewers clicked through to our campaign landing page, where we hosted educational resources from Google and our prebunking partners.

Measuring improved resilience to manipulation in 12 EU countries

We took a two pronged approach to measurement.

1 Live YouTube survey

We used custom surveys to measure the impact of our videos on YouTube. These surveys, called Brand Lift Surveys, are a tool available to advertisers on the platform. Within 48 hours of seeing a prebunking video on YouTube, a random sample of viewers (n = 304,565) were invited to complete a one question survey, which tested their ability to identify the manipulation technique. We engaged 57,541 survey participants in Poland, 72,382 in Germany, 83,027 in France, and 91,615 in Italy.

We asked the same three questions - one per video - from 15 May - 19 June 2024. Results were compared with responses from control groups who had not seen the videos. In line with past prebunking efforts, we used these results to measure improvements in viewers' abilities to recall and correctly identify misinformation tactics while online.

Results showed consistent increases in manipulation detection amongst our target demographic (Europeans aged 45+). To understand these results, we embarked on a second phase of research: an online lab study.

3.   After reaching this threshold during our paid media campaign, ads also reached YouTube viewers whose age was set to "unknown".

## 2 A lab study to measure efficacy holistically

In September 2024, we quantified the effectiveness of our prebunking videos through online lab testing. With the input of academic experts at the University of Kent, King's College London, and the University of Cambridge, this study aimed to collect significantly more qualitative and quantitative insights from our audience.

We surveyed over 19,000 EU citizens aged 45+ in 12 countries and 11 languages. The study involved large samples in countries where we ran ads, with a representative age and gender split (*Ns* = 522-2,800). Survey respondents watched one of three prebunking videos (Scapegoating, Discrediting, or Decontextualization) or a control video.

During live campaign measurement, we found that detection of the manipulation tactics increased across Europe. The average ability to detect manipulation after watching a prebunking video was 1.53% higher than in the control groups, which equates to more than 1.5 million potential voters. We saw overall improvements for viewers of every video, and in France and Italy, all three videos resulted in improved technique detection.[4]

▼ **Average percentage of viewers able to detect manipulation tactics through live campaign surveys**

The online lab study data offered valuable insights:

▷ **We recorded a statistically significant increase in viewers' ability to discern manipulative content from non-manipulative content for all videos in the overall analysis,**[5] and improved detection of manipulation in at least one video in every country, with large representative samples.

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4.   Discrediting did not have an effect in Germany, and the Discrediting and Scapegoating videos did not have an effect in Poland.
5.   This was demonstrated by the total number of correct answers for both manipulative and non-manipulative multiple choice questions. Our lab study also demonstrated improved manipulation discernment: survey respondents rated manipulative questions higher on perceived manipulativeness than the non-manipulative questions.

> **We estimated the videos' impact in eight additional countries.** This included seven that did not have a paid ad campaign during the EU elections (Lithuania, Spain, Romania, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ireland), and Belgium, where we ran paid ads in French and Flemish.

> **Short "booster" videos consistently improved detection of manipulation.** Respondents in France, Germany, and Italy, where we ran both 50 second and 20 second videos, benefited more from the longer prebunking videos. However, short-form videos may be a more effective and inexpensive means to scale prebunking, as they can be run as non-skippable ads on some platforms and more reliably guarantee viewers receive the complete message.

> **80.1% of our research participants (n=15,835) said that they voted in June's EU elections,** suggesting we reached a politically engaged audience and had a positive impact on their manipulation discernment.

Our lab study results are adjusted for comparison with the live YouTube surveys below. Lab experiments often yield larger effect sizes than field studies, and we accounted for this by reducing the effect sizes of the lab study results. To do so, we referenced the average difference between lab and field experiments in similar prebunking work from the academic literature, and divided study results by a factor of six.[6] This division gives us a conservative estimate of the campaign's true effect size, and allows us to compare the increase in detection after someone watched a prebunking video on YouTube.

The average increase in detecting manipulative content in a lab setting increased from 1.53% to 1.61%.

▼ **Average percentage of viewers able to detect manipulation tactics in lab vs live campaign**

This two-pronged research approach indicates that the prebunking videos increased an estimated 1.5 - 2M viewers' ability to recall misinformation tactics.

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6. This follows established standards in inoculation research to scale down expectations when interpreting lab results. It is drawn from a large-scale meta-analysis comparing lab and field studies in the nudging interventions literature, which found that lab results are approximately six times stronger than those in real-world settings, due to differences in motivation, distraction, and awareness. For example, in recent large-scale prebunking work, which used similar videos to build resilience to online manipulation techniques, lab experiment effects translated to field work effects by a division of approximately 5-6.

▼ Percentage of viewers who increased resilience to manipulation (millions)

Measurement	Scapegoating	Decontextualization	Discrediting	Total
Live campaign	0.43M	0.53M	0.56M	**1.52M**
Lab study **	0.73M	0.85M	0.43M	**2.01M**

** Includes estimates from additional paid media campaigns run in Hungary and Belgium.

We can estimate this impact with confidence due to the sample sizes of our online study, and the strength and consistency of improvements in detection, across every country, language and prebunking video we tested. For more information on how we estimated improved resilience to misinformation, please see the Appendix.

Improving online sharing decisions

During the lab study, we were excited to find that **viewers were more likely to share trustworthy, non-manipulative content online after watching a video.**

They reported higher intentions to share non-manipulative content after watching a prebunking video. Despite relatively small effects, those improved decisions can scale rapidly when interventions reach millions of people and educate them about online manipulation.

▼ Non-manipulative sharing intention - percentage increase (lab study) *

* Results for Scapegoating and Discrediting in Poland were non-significant.

Ultimately, this highlighted an overall improvement in sharing decisions, and indicates that our call to spot misinformation, and stop its spread, succeeded in activating an instinct to pause before amplifying misleading information.

Identifying moderators of prebunking efficacy

Our research found certain factors made two of our videos more or less effective across the EU.

Discrediting: improved ability to identify this tactic was linked to higher educational attainment and self-reported political tolerance.

Scapegoating: improved ability to identify this tactic was linked to higher educational attainment and self-reported political tolerance, as well as nations' geographic locations,[7] GDP per capita, and education indices.

Improvements from watching the Decontextualization video were not affected by these factors.

▼ **Average improvement in manipulation discernment**

		Discrediting (%)	Scapegoating (%)
Educational attainment	High	2.8	3.7
	Low	0.15	0.6
Political tolerance	High	2.8	2.7
	Low	-0.4	1.0
GDP	High	*No effect*	3.7
	Low		0.8
Education index	High	*No effect*	3.9
	Low		0.5
European geography[7]	West	*No effect*	4.3
	East		0.1

7. We found that Eastern Europeans have a higher baseline ability to detect scapegoating, which explains the weaker effect of prebunking in Eastern EU countries.

Lessons for future prebunking initiatives

Drawing on these results, as well as findings from three other prebunking initiatives with Jigsaw and Google in Germany, Indonesia and Ukraine, we identified learnings for future prebunking efforts:

✓ Educational videos can build resilience to misinformation across the EU

Every prebunking video built resilience to manipulation tactics. Videos were effective in all EU nations in our study, regardless of country, technique, or video length. During live campaign measurement on YouTube, the videos built resilience to manipulation techniques in every paid media market, and we found similar effects to the [academic literature on prebunking](#).

Viewers were also better at distinguishing manipulative content from non-manipulative content after watching the videos. This means we did not make individuals distrustful of accurate information: rather, their ability to discern between manipulative and reliable information improved. This indicates that the videos gave EU voters a vocabulary to detect manipulation online (e.g. scapegoating) without making them less trusting of reliable information.

✓ Shorter "booster" videos can improve manipulation detection

In addition to the 50 second prebunking videos, we created three 20 second "boosters" for audiences in Germany, France and Italy. These included a brief forewarning about online manipulation and a tactic definition.

While not quite as effective as longer videos, the short assets had consistently positive results in our lab study, indicating that they can be used as effective booster videos. Videos of this length can be run as non-skippable ads on platforms like YouTube - resulting in a larger number of viewers watching and absorbing a prebunking message. Given the trend toward short-form video on social platforms, content like this can be an effective tool to build resilience to misinformation at scale.

▼ **Increase in detection of manipulation by video length**

✓ EU citizens want to learn more about information integrity

During our paid media campaign, over 1 million Europeans visited Google's website to learn more about election misinformation and how to protect themselves from manipulation. They viewed and downloaded media literacy resources from national and EU-wide fact checkers, the European Parliament, EDMO, and other media and civil society partners who featured on our landing page

In the lab study, respondents expressed the most interest in learning how to find accurate and reliable information online, as well as how to fact check and verify it.

▼ What does our audience want to learn more about?

How to find accurate and reliable information
19.5%

How to fact check online content
18.4%

How to verify information online
16.7%

How to protect your family and friends from manipulation online
14.0%

How to define mis- and disinformation
10.7%

How mis- and disinformation can impact elections
10.5%

How generative AI can be used to create images, video and audio content
10.0%

0%   5%   10%   15%   20%

✓ Citizens trust experts more than government, NGOs or news media

Our lab study also found that trust is an important component to the success of prebunking and information integrity campaigns.

EU citizens show higher trust in industry experts, scientific and academic organizations, independent content creators, and friends and family. Trust is lowest in celebrities, politicians and religious organizations.

▼ Who does our audience trust to deliver a prebunking campaign?

Industry experts
14.8%

Scientific organizations
12.2%

Independent content creators
11.3%

Academic institutions
10.5%

Friends or family
10.4%

News media
8.7%

NGOs
7.4%

Government
6.8%

Professional associations
6.4%

Tech companies
5.6%

Community leaders
1.9%

Influencers/celebrities
1.7%

Politicians
1.3%

Religious organizations
1.1%

0%   5%   10%   15%

Conclusion

Prebunking can empower people to discern between manipulative and reliable information at scale around elections.

Σ **Short educational videos can protect Europeans against future threats.** Enduring misinformation tactics can be addressed using the same videos or similar preventive messages. Our prebunking content did not reference elections - only common manipulation tactics - meaning they can be deployed again rapidly to build resilience at any time.

Σ **Balance scale with impact.** We used animations in this campaign to enable content to scale across multiple markets ahead of EU-wide elections quickly, and within resource constraints. In other contexts, locally relevant live action and influencer-led prebunking videos have had more impact in improving resilience to manipulation, but are more costly and time consuming to create. That said, influencer-led content may feel more authentic, connect better with local audiences, and ultimately increase the impact of prebunking.

Σ **Partner with trusted messengers.** Understanding the groups and individuals most trusted by target audiences can improve the reach and effectiveness of prebunking campaigns in Europe and beyond. Future campaigns should leverage the most credible messengers of prebunking content, and the appetite to learn about certain skills or topics related to misinformation, which differ between countries and groups.

Σ **Tailor messages for hard-to-reach audiences.** Certain groups may be more susceptible to misinformation, and messaging is most effective when customized for its audience. While this campaign generally targeted the 45+ demographic, it was not reflective of the diversity within this group. Future efforts can explore ways of reaching audiences that are susceptible to misinformation in specific contexts, with more tailored messaging and demographic targeting.

Σ **Engage groups with low baseline understanding of online manipulation and media literacy.** Future efforts can target audiences who start with weaker understanding of key manipulation tactics, and protect those most at-risk in our society. These include individuals with low educational attainment, as well as geographic factors: for example, Western EU citizens demonstrated a lower baseline ability to discern manipulative content. Effects were also weaker among participants in nations with lower per capita GDP. Prioritizing prebunking and media literacy efforts can even out discernment levels across nations. Incorporating teachable components into prebunking campaigns (e.g. elements of media literacy; the value of political tolerance) can also avoid the dampening effects of these factors in improving manipulation discernment.

Teaching manipulation discernment can snowball, building skills that help individuals protect themselves - and others - from misinformation online.

Appendix:

Lab study methodology

In September and October 2024 Moonshot ran surveys in 12 countries and 11 languages to evaluate the efficacy of the prebunking videos. We engaged large samples in paid media markets, and a representative age and gender split (n= 522-2,800). Survey conditions included: respondents watching one of three prebunking videos (Scapegoating; Discrediting; or Decontextualization) or a control video. We also tested the efficacy of short (20s) vs. long (50s) videos, in three markets: France, Italy, and Germany.

We prepared 72 survey questions to measure factors including: if the intervention videos are effective across nations; potential moderating effects (e.g. education); self-reported voting behavior; and who audiences in each country trust to deliver prebunking messages.

Sample	Condition (Video)	Manipulation discernment questions	Additional questions
N = 130-400 per condition	Decontextualization Discrediting Scapegoating Control	Presented with 16-18 questions: 8-9 manipulative; 8-9 non-manipulative. (16 = exposed; 18 = control) Rate: Manipulativeness, confidence, sharing intentions, manipulation tactic.	Voting behaviour; education; misinformation susceptibility; self-reported political ideology and political tolerance; digital literacy; feedback on what else to learn and who to trust.

Calculating increased resilience to misinformation

We took the following steps to estimate the impact of our prebunking videos, and compare our paid survey and online lab study results:

1 Identify a comparable measurement

- Both of our measurement approaches used identical multiple-choice questions. They assessed if respondents recognized manipulation techniques in a headline, after watching a relevant video.

- We measured the percentage difference in correct responses between video viewers and control groups to get a "lift" score for each video. This represents the increase in viewers' ability to detect manipulation after watching a video.

2 Account for the effect sizes of a lab study

- Lab experiments in social science often yield larger effect sizes than field studies or real-world settings, due to the controlled environment.

- We therefore divided our lab study results by six, to get a conservative estimation of true effect size. This follows a general rule in academic research to account for the higher variability when translating controlled experiments to field work, as well as prebunking work confirming a similar division from lab to field.

3 Estimate impact using the same calculation

- To calculate the number of individuals whose resilience to misinformation increased, we multiplied "lift score" by the number of individuals who watched a video (reach). This measurement approach is consistent with previous prebunking campaigns in Central and Eastern Europe, Germany, Indonesia and Ukraine.

- For example, if a video produced 2.1% lift in France, and reached 1M viewers, we estimated that 21,000 French citizens increased their resilience to that technique (# = 0.021 * 1,000,000)

- Using the lab study results, this approach allows us to estimate the number of people whose resilience increased in countries where paid media surveys could not run during limited ad campaigns: Belgium and Hungary. The estimated impact, based on our lab study results, is shown below.

Technique	Country	Reach	Lift * (Increase in manipulation discernment)	Individuals whose resilience improved
Scapegoating	Hungary	1,333,467 **	1.63%	21,780
Decontextualization	Hungary	1,333,467 **	1.94%	25,847
Discrediting	Hungary	1,333,467 **	0.91%	12,090
Scapegoating	Belgium (Flemish)	871,155 **	1.02%	8,900
Decontextualization	Belgium (Flemish)	871,155 **	No lift	0
Discrediting	Belgium (Flemish)	871,155**	No lift	0
Scapegoating	Belgium (French)	948,814 **	2.45%	23,214
Decontextualization	Belgium (French)	948,814 **	No lift	0
Discrediting	Belgium (French)	948,814 **	1.82%	17,268
Scapegoating	France	10,448,839	1.66%	173,451
Decontextualization	France	10,354,806	1.79%	185,524
Discrediting	France	10,256,604	1.68%	171,798
Scapegoating	Germany	13,185,920	2.06%	271,630
Decontextualization	Germany	12,878,709	2.71%	349,442
Discrediting	Germany	12,960,758	1.05%	136,088
Scapegoating	Italy	8,669,771	1.05%	91,177
Decontextualization	Italy	8,809,005	2.32%	204,075
Discrediting	Italy	8,850,656	No lift	0
Scapegoating	Poland	5,941,067	2.31%	136,942
Decontextualization	Poland	5,984,078	1.46%	87,567
Discrediting	Poland	5,940,406	1.62%	96,334
Scapegoating	Hungary	1,333,467 **	1.63%	2,013,127

* For comparison with live campaign measurement, lift below 0.8% was treated as no lift, and excluded from the actual lift calculation.
** The number of unique viewers of an ad (reach) for Hungary and Belgium was not disaggregated by video (technique). Our Lab Study and paid media surveys measured a lift score per video. For this estimate, the total reach in Belgium and Hungary is divided evenly by video, and multiplied by lift, to estimate the number of viewers whose resilience increased.

About Moonshot

Moonshot is a social impact business with a mission to end online harms, applying evidence, ethics and human rights. We deliver global initiatives to empower the public to keep themselves safe from online threats, reaching over 300 million people across the globe. Moonshot additionally delivers a proven violence prevention model to connect people in need with life-saving services online. Our work is rooted in the fundamental belief that change is possible. Moonshot operates globally from four offices: Dublin, London, Toronto, and Washington D.C.