moonshot

ONLINE THREATS, REAL WORLD VIOLENCE

IN THE UNITED STATES:

HOW DIGITAL HATE EVOLVED IN 2025

Executive Summary

This report presents the major trends in online targeted violence in the United States in 2025, drawing on data from Moonshot's Threat Bulletin — our ongoing monitoring of more than 30 mainstream and fringe social media platforms. The year 2025 marked a fundamental shift in how online threats of violence translate to offline violence.

Four defining patterns that represent structural evolutions in the threat landscape emerged:

1 | **Youth radicalization through violent nihilistic networks reached unprecedented levels.** Children and teenagers moved from online engagement to planned or executed attacks at alarming rates, with nearly all attackers connected to these networks under age 18.

2 | **Political violence functioned as a powerful trigger** activating coordinated targeting across multiple unrelated communities simultaneously. Single incidents generated threats against politicians, LGBTQ+, Black, Jewish, immigrant, and Muslim communities through distinct but reinforcing narratives.

↑ 29% In 2025, September represented the greatest increase in overall threat volumes in online spaces relevant to targeted violence (TV) compared to the previous 12 months, reaching over 9,200 threats per week. This followed the assassination of Charlie Kirk.

3 | **Immigration discourse solidified how various communities are portrayed within Great Replacement frameworks,** entrenching a narrative that enables the targeting of multiple groups at once.

4 | **Technical barriers to large-scale harassment collapsed** as online communities exploited accessible AI, swatting-as-a-service, and automated targeting tools.

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For a full methodology, including how we collect and analyze this data and the definitions used, please refer to **Appendix A on page 17.**

Youth Radicalization Through Violent Nihilistic Networks

The year 2025 marked an alarming rise in youth radicalization by violent nihilistic networks, with children and teenagers moving from online engagement to planned or executed attacks faster than intervention systems can respond. For the first time in monitoring history, one online subcommunity within violent nihilistic networks — the True Crime Community (TCC) — has been linked to at least ten school shootings and mass attack plots in a single year. This concentration of attacks is marked by international spread and the rapid elevation of December 2024's Madison, WI shooter Natalie Rupnow to "iconic status" within TCC spaces, highlighting a radicalization pathway that emerged in 2024 in which TCC spaces foster desensitization to violence, aid in collaborative attack planning, and collectively glorify each successive TCC-linked attacker. The ideological overlap between TCC and other violent nihilistic networks compounds these risks, as exposure to extreme content can provide additional justifications for violence and shift target selection toward political figures or places of worship rather than schools alone.

↘ Scope and Speed of Youth Radicalization

Violent nihilistic networks, subgroups, and subcultures including the TCC, Order of Nine Angles (O9A), No Lives Matter (NLM), Tempel ov Blood (ToB), Maniac Murder Cult (MKY), and the sextortion network 764 share overlapping user communities, tactics, and messaging which glorify violence and brutality. Of completed or thwarted violent nihilistic attacks in 2025, the majority demonstrate some connection to the TCC. **Globally, all but two attackers linked to the TCC in the past year were under age 18** — with incidents occurring in Wisconsin, Tennessee, Minnesota, Colorado, Austria, Indonesia, and elsewhere. While most youth who consume TCC content online never engage in violence, the community can function as an entry point to violence and other nihilistic networks like NLM and 764.

↘ The True Crime Community as an Entry Point

The TCC represents a decentralized community of individuals interested in crime and mass attackers. It facilitates violence primarily through idolizing and romanticizing mass killers, socially rewarding users' connections to successful attackers, providing guidance on attack planning, and desensitizing users to extreme violence. Attackers with connections to the TCC, such as Natalie Rupnow, inspire one another across international borders via the global TCC, with each incident serving as inspiration for the next. Rupnow's December 2024 attack exemplifies this pattern: she was inspired by a Turkish attacker, then became a source of inspiration for an exponential list shooters in 2025 in Tennessee, Minnesota, Colorado, Austria, and Indonesia. This rapid propagation, with multiple copycat incidents occurring within months of one another, represents an acceleration of TCC-linked violence unprecedented in previous years.

⬊ Key TCC-Linked Attacks Influenced by Rupnow:

Natalie Rupnow (Madison, WI, December 2024) was influenced by Turkish attacker Arda Küçükyetim after being invited to his Telegram channel; Rupnow later cited him as inspiration in her manifesto.

Solomon Henderson (Antioch, TN, January 2025) celebrated mutual social media follows with Rupnow prior to his attack.

Arthur Achleitner (Graz, Austria, June 2025) referenced Rupnow multiple times; posted a photo mimicking her pose minutes before his attack.

Robin Westman (Minneapolis, MN, August 2025) was motivated by desire to emulate past shooters.

Desmond Holly (Evergreen, CO, September 2025) celebrated by TCC members for prior online interactions; solicited advice on weapons and equipment from TCC members.

An unnamed teenager (Jakarta, Indonesia, November 2025) posted a photo to TikTok mimicking Rupnow with a "#TCC" hashtag before his bombing of a mosque at a school complex.

Figure 1. Photos posted by attackers Henderson, Achleitner, and Rupnow on X minutes before their shootings. Henderson and Achleitner copied Rupnow's pose, black combat boots, and bathroom stall setting.

The Network of Influence Stemming from Natalie Rupnow's December 2024 Attack

Rupnow was inspired by him and active in the Telegram channel where he shared the livestream of his stabbing

Arda Küçükyetim
Tepebaşi Mosque Stabbing | Eskişehir, Turkey
Aug 2024

Discussed targets and operational planning

Alexander Paffendorf
Foiled Plot | Carlsbad, California
Dec 2024

Followed each other on X: Rupnow inspired Henderson

Solomon Henderson
Antioch High School Shooter | Nashville, Tennessee
Jan 2025

Referenced Henderson and Rupnow on TCC Tumblr account

Trinity Shockley
Foiled Plot | Mooresville, Indiana
Feb 2025

Natalie Rupnow
Abundant Life Christian School
Madison, Wisconsin
Dec 2024

Influential attacker in TCC spaces in 2025

Discussed targets and operational planning

Damien Allen
Foiled Plot | West Palm Beach, Florida
Apr 2025

Posted photo posing like Rupnow

Arthur Achleitner
Graz Secondary School Shooter | Graz, Austria
Jun 2025

Wrote Rupnow's name on weapon

Robin Westman
Annunciation Catholic Church Shooter | Minneapolis, Minnesota
Aug 2025

Posted photos posing like Rupnow

Desmond Holly
Evergreen High School Shooter | Evergreen, Colorado
Sep 2025

Posted photo posing like Rupnow

Unnamed Indonesian Teenager
State High School 72 | Jakarta, Indonesia
Nov 2025

Figure 2. The network of influence stemming from Natalie Rupnow's December 2024 attack, illustrating the progression and interconnected nature of TCC-linked violence in 2025.

Ideological Overlap with Adjacent Nihilistic Networks

While TCC-linked attackers often pursue violence for notoriety rather than clear ideological motivations, substantial overlap exists with nihilistic accelerationist and sextortion networks that provide additional motivations and justifications for violence. This overlap increases the risk that ideological components factor into an attacker's target selection — leading to attacks on political figures or places of worship rather than attackers' own schools — and increases risk of harm to minors as youth may be groomed, sextorted, or influenced to groom and coerce their peers. Six groups or networks demonstrating this overlap include:

The Order of Nine Angles (O9A)

- ⅀ O9A is a decentralized, satanic, occultist, neo-Nazi network originating in the United Kingdom in the 1970s that operates through autonomous cells or branches called "nexions."

- ⅀ The group has become increasingly influential among accelerationist neo-Nazi groups and online sextortion networks such as 764 in recent years.

- ⅀ In April 2025, a 17-year-old with alleged O9A affiliation in Wisconsin was arrested for killing his parents in a plot to assassinate President Trump and overthrow the U.S. government. He possessed O9A-related material and writings calling for revolution to "save the white race" — demonstrating how ideological beliefs can shift youth attacks beyond school settings.

- ⅀ Multiple TCC-linked attackers (Rupnow, Henderson, Holly, Westman, Küçükyetim) expressed white supremacist beliefs and praised racially motivated perpetrators.

Figure 3. O9A's primary symbol, the Septenary Sigil.

No Lives Matter (NLM)

- ⅀ NLM is a misanthropic neo-Nazi group advocating for violence, terrorism, and humanity's destruction that emerged alongside the 764 sextortion network.

- ⅀ NLM uses O9A imagery aesthetically while focusing on nihilistic violence and extortion over O9A's occult practices.

- ⅀ In May 2025, NLM released operational guides for explosives, knife, firearm, and vehicle attacks, actively soliciting individuals to carry out targeted killings in multiple U.S. cities.

- ⅀ The group requires prospective members to carry out recorded acts of violence to obtain membership.

Figure 4. NLM's logo. It is often overlaid with O9A-related occultist imagery.

Maniac Murder Cult (MKY)

> MKY is a neo-Nazi accelerationist group originating in Ukraine that shares videos depicting and encouraging acts of violence, including street assaults and arson.

> MKY helped inspire a Tennessee school shooting (Henderson's attack), demonstrating direct influence on TCC-linked violence.

> In November 2025, an MKY leader pleaded guilty in federal court to soliciting hate crimes and distributing bomb-making information, including a 2023 plot to recruit people to give poisoned candy to Jewish children and racial minorities in New York City.

Figure 5. The cover image of MKY's "Haters Handbook, Third Edition," which depicts founder Yegor Krasnov. The publication details a scoring system to reward individuals for murders.

Satanic Front

> Satanic Front is an occultist, militant accelerationist group that emphasizes taking concrete accelerationist action.

> The group has released operational guides on conducting sabotage, attacks, and ritual murders, framing violence as a pseudoreligious act.

Figure 6. An image from "The Blighted Path, Volume One" by Satanic Front. The publication describes how to engage in ritualistic violence.

Tempel ov Blood (ToB)

> ToB is an American O9A chapter focused on infiltrating accelerationist groups and inciting individuals to commit acts of violence.

> Through its publishing arm, Martinet Press, ToB releases books depicting graphic violence to desensitize readers.

> The ToB parody group, Tempel ov Bob, also disseminates ToB content alongside references to unrelated mass shootings.

Figure 7. The cover of ToB book "Liber 333," which outlines infiltrating neo-Nazi and Christian Identity movements as a method for conducting attacks against Western society.

764

- 764 is a loosely organized online network known for coercing children to produce sexually explicit images or harm themselves or others.

- Throughout 2025, individuals posted sextortion guidance in 764-affiliated online forums and channels describing how to target children perceived to be particularly vulnerable, such as children visiting self-harm and eating disorder online communities.

- Users affiliated with 764 sextort children for abusive reasons, for financial gain, and to increase one's standing within 764, with content that is more violent or extreme lending higher status.

Figure 8. An image from a 764-affiliated Telegram channel. The name "764" is derived from the first three digits of the founder's zip code.

Platform Exploitation and Algorithmic Amplification

Violent nihilistic networks exploit mainstream platforms accessible to children, including video games and gaming-adjacent platforms such as Roblox and Discord, and visual-first platforms such as TikTok and Pinterest through a variety of strategies. Two prominent tactics involve exploiting aesthetic camouflage and algorithmic recommendation and moderation systems.

1 Visual-First Platform Exploitation

- TCC and adjacent NVE networks camouflage extremist content within popular gothic, occult, and "dark" aesthetics mimicking the logos above on visual-first platforms like Pinterest and TikTok.

- Platform recommendation algorithms inadvertently amplify this content through visual similarity matching, creating pathways from benign alternative content to violence-glorifying material.

Figure 9. Content from nihilistic accelerationist networks Order of Nine Angles (O9A) and Tempel ov Blood (ToB) interspersed among visually similar but unrelated occult content on Pinterest.

② Content Moderation Evasion Tactics

"AI" labeling for evasion:

⅀ Users in TCC spaces on TikTok began falsely labeling fan videos of perpetrators as "AI-generated" fictional characters to bypass TikTok moderation in 2025.

⅀ Some users acknowledge using AI tools like Viggle.AI to create videos of beloved perpetrators.

⅀ This weaponization of AI content labels complicates platforms' ability to distinguish AI-generated from authentic content.

Mislabeled mass attack simulation games:

⅀ Members of the TCC and others have created games and game modifications glorifying past attackers, offering players a chance to carry out simulated playable versions of attacks. Detailed maps and weapons selection features are often included in these games, and the content is regularly reuploaded to Roblox and Steam despite takedowns.

↘ Youth Vulnerability and Developmental Exploitation

Children encounter violent nihilistic content on mainstream platforms like TikTok and Roblox before developing critical media literacy skills, with isolated or bullied youth especially vulnerable to narratives portraying mass attackers as misunderstood figures. Nihilistic networks exploit belonging-seeking behavior by offering status through connections to attackers, transforming normal adolescent needs for peer acceptance into pathways toward violence. Repeated exposure to violence-glorifying content and desensitizing material — including attack footage, gore videos, and tactical discussions — creates pathways where youth may internalize violent ideologies over time.

⊞ KEY PATTERN

Youth radicalization through contact with violent nihilistic networks accelerated dramatically in 2025, with TCC-linked copycat attacks occurring within months, nihilistic attacks foiled, and nearly 2,000 reports of abuse tied to these networks in 2025. Prevention strategies should include:

- addressing platform accountability for algorithmic amplification and terms of service violations that are unaddressed;
- education for parents, caregivers, and educators about the dangers of TCC, 764 and other nihilistic networks and how they can help keep their children safe online;
- and primary prevention efforts at the community level to address vulnerabilities in youth.

Political Violence as a Catalyst for Identity-Based Threat Ecosystems

Political participation became a direct risk factor for targeted violence in 2025 for a growing range of communities. Attacks on political figures were used in TV-relevant spaces[1] as justification to threaten not only other politicians, but multiple unrelated communities simultaneously based on presumed political affiliation. High-profile assassinations generated concurrent threat spikes toward politicians, LGBTQ+ communities, Black communities, and other groups, with users blaming each community for the same incident through distinct narratives. This pattern represents a shift in how political violence shapes the online threat environment: rather than functioning as isolated events, attacks are now treated as part of a continuum that activates established, politically-driven blame and scapegoating narratives. This directs hostility toward politically engaged individuals and multiple identity-based communities simultaneously, transforming political participation into a compounded risk factor for targeted violence.

⬂ Cascading Multi-Community Threats

The Charlie Kirk assassination in September 2025 exemplified this pattern. Within 48 hours of his death, threats of violence spiked to two-year highs targeting multiple communities:

88%	84%	77%
Politicians (both Republican and Democrat) received threat volumes 88% above the 12-month baseline[2].	**LGBTQ+ communities** reached threat levels 84% above baseline.	**Black communities** reached threat levels 77% above baseline.

In TV-relevant spaces, users blamed each group through distinct but mutually-reinforcing narratives, with threats to one community justifying threats against others. **Throughout 2025, acts of political violence consistently activated threats against five or more distinct target groups simultaneously,** with each incident treated as proof of coordinated conspiracy across unrelated groups.

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1. "TV-relevant spaces" refers to online spaces where discourse associated with targeted violence is present. For detail on targeted violence coverage, please refer to Appendix A: Methodology.
2. Changes in volumes of threats are provided relative to a rolling average of the previous 12 months of data unless specified otherwise.

↘ From Reactive to Persistent Threat Infrastructure

20%+

Threats of violence toward politicians reached **20%+** above baseline **four times** in 2025 — compared to only two times in 2024. This doubling in the frequency of major threat spikes indicates that elevated threat activity did not entirely subside after the 2024 election cycle ended. Instead, the spaces, networks, and narratives that generated threats during the campaign remained active throughout 2025.

SEPTEMBER SPIKE

The drivers of these spikes demonstrate that threats toward politicians now activate significantly in response to diverse triggers beyond political violence alone. While the September spike followed the **Charlie Kirk assassination**, other elevations stemmed from judicial rulings, policy debates, and political controversies. The threat landscape features potential for rapid amplification from varied political and policy developments, with **acts of political violence serving as the most potent accelerant.**

📈 Online Threats of Violence Targeting Politicians

Figure 10. Threats toward politicians in TV-relevant spaces since January 2025, reaching 20%+ above baseline four times — double the frequency observed in 2024.

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3. Moonshot defines an online post as containing a threat of violence when it includes a direct verbal threat (e.g. "I'm going to shoot my local politician"), broader incitements to violence (e.g. "You should kill your politicians"), or expressions of support for violence (e.g. "Politicians deserve to hang").

↘ Online Threat Landscape as a Barrier to Political Participation

The online threat environment created barriers to political participation in 2025, particularly for marginalized communities. Identity-based targeting of candidates and tactical threats against demonstrations combined to make political engagement itself a risk factor.

🪪 Identity-Based Political Targeting

⅀ Traditional political criticism around policy disagreements or issues of corruption merged heavily with identity-based hostility in 2025, with narratives alleging "foreign infiltration," "foreign control," "racial threats," and "demographic displacement" becoming increasingly common in TV-relevant spaces.

⅀ Candidates from marginalized communities faced layered threats that majority-group candidates typically don't: alongside typical political attacks about policy or corruption, they were also targeted based on their race, religion, or ethnicity.

> For example, in the month preceding New York City's mayoral election, 22% of posts in TV-relevant spaces mentioning candidate Zohran Mamdani contained anti-Muslim or anti-Asian slurs.

🪓 Threats Targeting Political Demonstrations

⅀ **Calls for vehicle attacks against political protesters surged 121% in June** amid a series of various widespread political demonstrations. These online threats preceded actual incidents at demonstrations, and were normalized through viral misinformation claiming legal protection for drivers, explicit encouragement to drive through protest areas, and memes featuring bloodied vehicles.

⅀ Users framed physical attacks on demonstrations, political infrastructure, and politicians — including arson attacks on Pennsylvania Governor Shapiro's residence and on New Mexico Republican Party headquarters — as valid mechanisms to "raise the costs" of political participation.

⊞ KEY PATTERN

Political violence in 2025 functioned as a catalyst within TV-relevant spaces, with users rapidly synthesizing disparate narratives and encouraging violence toward multiple communities simultaneously. The shift from event-driven to continuous elevated threat activity, combined with identity-based targeting that compounded risks for marginalized candidates and tactical threats against demonstrations, created multilayered barriers to democratic engagement. This online environment threatens not only individual political figures, but transforms political participation itself into a risk factor for targeted violence, particularly for marginalized communities.

Immigration Events and Narratives Drive Multi-Community Targeting

Immigration was a driving issue behind threats of violence and significant volumes of TV discourse in 2025, with immigration-related policy developments, enforcement actions, and attacks on ICE facilities triggering hostility toward multiple communities. As immigration dominated policy and news cycles throughout the year, sustained hostile discussions within TV-relevant spaces operated as consensus-building processes that solidified each targeted community's "assigned role" in the Great Replacement theory — the belief in an alleged demographic replacement of white people. Users portrayed Latin American, Asian, Muslim, Jewish, and Black communities as distinct threats within replacement frameworks — positioning them as various forms of both foreign and domestic threat — with these assigned roles becoming increasingly entrenched and reliably activated throughout 2025.

## Entrenched Characterizations Within Replacement Narratives

Latin American communities were portrayed as the "primary face of immigration." **In 2025, Latin American communities entered the top ten most-targeted groups** by volume of threats for the first time since 2022, with threats **spiking 282% in June** and maintaining sustained elevation through autumn as major immigration enforcement flashpoints reliably triggered intense hostility and calls for violence.

Asian communities, and particularly South Asian communities, were portrayed as "economic competitors." **Asian communities were the only group to experience year-over-year threat increases in 2025**, with anti-Asian narratives sparked by December 2024's H-1B visa debates. Economic and demographic displacement narratives persisted throughout the year.

Muslim communities were portrayed as "foreign infiltrators seeking Islamic takeover." **Threats toward Muslim communities reached a 10-month high in June as users in TV-relevant spaces claimed Middle East conflicts would drive Muslim immigration to the U.S.**, after which Muslim communities would allegedly infiltrate institutions to "impose Sharia law." Users claimed that prominent Muslim candidates running for office in 2025 represented proof that "infiltration" was already underway.

Jewish communities were portrayed as "conspiratorial architects orchestrating immigration." **Threats toward Jewish communities reached a 14-month high in June amid a 215% increase in antisemitic conspiratorial narratives** claiming the group manipulates migration and global conflicts. Use of the term "the noticing" exhibited dramatic year-over-year increases in 2025 (249% higher than 2021; 2,819% higher than 2020), with the term functioning as a shorthand for claiming to recognize alleged Jewish orchestration of demographic change and perceived societal decline. Jewish communities remain the most targeted group of all monitored communities (see Figure 11 for overall threat volumes against these communities).

Black communities were portrayed as a "domestic demographic threat" parallel to alleged foreign immigration dangers. **Threats reached a 26-month high in September, with white supremacist networks regularly transforming isolated viral incidents into nationalized "proof" of systematic Black violence against white populations.** Videos and reports from Rochester, MN (verbal confrontation), Cincinnati, OH (fight videos), Frisco, TX and Charlotte, NC (stabbings) were stripped of context and amplified across TV-relevant spaces as "evidence" that Black communities constitute an existential danger requiring neo-Nazi and white separatist organizing.

☑ Average Monthly Online Threats of Violence Targeting Five Communities

Figure 11. Average monthly online threats of violence in 2025 for five communities facing significant immigration-related online hostility.

⊞ **KEY PATTERN**

Immigration discourse in 2025 consolidated various communities' characterizations within TV-relevant spaces, with Latin American, Asian, Muslim, Jewish, and Black communities portrayed as distinct but interconnected threats within Great Replacement narratives. Throughout the year, any event construed through a racialized "foreigners-vs.-natives" framework reliably triggered online threats matching these assigned roles. Meta-level debates within TV-relevant spaces focused on which community presented the "biggest problem" to be addressed via violence, with different communities prioritized depending on current events while their roles within replacement narratives remained consistent. The entrenchment of these roles — evidenced by sustained elevated threat volumes, dramatic year-over-year increases in hostile language, and reliable activation patterns during immigration-related incidents — solidified immigration as a durable topic enabling coordinated multi-community targeted violence.

Technical Tools Enabling Large-Scale Hate and Harassment

Technical barriers to large-scale harassment collapsed in 2025 as users in TV-relevant spaces exploited accessible technologies in three key ways. First, users developed tools to facilitate hate and harassment at large scales. Second, swatting became an increasingly commercialized service, with groups like Purgatory offering hoax bomb threats as purchasable products. Third, users adopted AI to generate content that validates their beliefs and grievances, and to evade platform moderation. These developments — some of which previously required significant technical expertise — fundamentally lowered barriers to coordinated hate and harassment as technology accessibility outpaces platform and law enforcement capacity to respond.

Three Emerging Technical Capabilities

1 Automation of Harassment and Discrimination

› TV-relevant communities developed systematic workflows for converting breached or leaked databases into coordinated harassment infrastructure, treating leaked data as resources for sustained targeting. This was exemplified in the harassment-enabling maps of women's locations created following a breach by 4chan users of the dating safety app "Tea" in July 2025. **Following this breach, online threats of violence toward women reached their highest level observed in three years** (see Figure 12).

› Custom browser extensions and automated filtering tools enabled users to curate their online experiences to exclude content from specific demographic groups based on names, language characters, and cultural markers. An anti-Indian browser extension released in October and promoted by white supremacist networks on X offered tools to automatically hide content posted by Indian and Indian-American X users, as well as Muslim and Jewish users. This type of tool can fragment users' internet experiences into echo chambers where TV-relevant narratives face diminishing challenge.

Online Threats of Violence Targeting Women

Figure 12. Threats toward women in TV-relevant spaces since August 2022, reaching **69%** above baseline in July 2025 amid 4chan users' data breach of the "Tea" dating safety app.

② Commercialization of Swatting Services

- A spate of groups offering swatting as a paid service transformed serious hoax threats from activities requiring technical sophistication into purchasable services with established workflows and community support. In August 2025, a group called "Purgatory" launched hoax bomb and shooting threats targeting multiple universities. Purgatory has also previously targeted K-12 schools and is part of a broader violent nihilistic and criminal network called the Com. The group formed as an offshoot of 764.

- The groups livestreamed operations via Discord and Telegram while sharing tactical advice with viewers in real-time, creating knowledge-sharing systems where participants learn techniques by observing operations.

③ AI Adoption for Content Generation, Ideological Validation, and Evasion

- Users in TV-relevant spaces adopted AI tools to validate their beliefs, with seemingly authoritative AI outputs used to confirm conspiracy theories and personal grievances. Users coordinated AI model subscription-sharing and strategies to extract desired responses from chatbots, treating AI as a legitimizing source for their assertions.

- AI-generated racist content served to normalize and reinforce hostility, with users explicitly framing such content as tools to spread hatred across TV-relevant and mainstream spaces.

- Users evaded content moderation through two approaches: falsely labeling actual extreme or violent content as "AI-generated and harmless" to avoid removal, and genuinely using AI to create many variations of the same content that slip past automated detection systems. For example, TCC-linked accounts on TikTok used AI tools to generate several variations of clips showing attack perpetrators dancing, including Christchurch, NZ mass shooter Brenton Tarrant and Sandy Hook Elementary School shooter Adam Lanza. This strategy created challenges for platforms trying to detect content violating guidelines around violence, gore, and terrorism.

Figure 13. An AI-generated video depicting AI-generated ethnic minorities demanding food stamps and Section 8 housing that received over **231,000 views** on TikTok, posted in October 2025 amid the U.S. federal government shutdown. Analysis suggested most viewers believed the video depicted real events.

Appendix A: Methodology

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⬚ Targeted Violence (TV) Coverage

This report, based on findings from Moonshot's Threat Bulletin, analyzes content from over **700** publicly accessible online "spaces" (groups, channels and forums) across more than **30** mainstream and fringe social media platforms, including 4chan, Telegram, X, Reddit, Gab, Bluesky, and Instagram. We select the spaces we monitor based on whether they include content related to targeted violence. This includes Homegrown Violent Extremism (HVE), Domestic Violent Extremism (DVE), school violence, and mass shootings where ideological motivations are present. Coverage also includes discourse related to violence where motivations may be mixed, unclear, or driven by a combination of nihilistic worldviews and loose ideological frameworks, such as cases involving nihilistic violent extremism (NVE). All incidents are evaluated against consistent definitional criteria regardless of ideological orientation, with categorization decisions reviewed by multiple subject matter experts to ensure objectivity and non-partisan application of our threat assessment framework.

Throughout this report, "TV-relevant spaces" refers to online communities, forums, channels, and platforms where discussions, content, or narratives related to targeted violence are observed.

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▥ Data Collection & AI-powered Analysis

Data collection is powered by Moonshot's proprietary data aggregation tools, with initial assessment powered by AI models trained on hundreds of thousands of posts to detect key narratives, trends, and threats at scale. All AI-generated information undergoes rigorous review by subject matter experts to ensure accuracy and capture contextual nuances. Our analysis leverages comprehensive databases of thousands of TV and threat indicators to identify threats of violence and potentially harmful content. Threat categorization focuses on ideological motivation and target selection rather than positioning incidents along a left-right political spectrum, recognizing that some forms of targeted violence (such as violence driven by anti-government sentiment, conspiracy narratives, and nihilistic accelerationism) span multiple ideological frameworks or resist traditional categorization.

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⊡ Monitored Communities and Threat Management

Moonshot tracks threats of violence against more than **20 distinct communities**, including demographic groups (e.g., Jewish, Muslim, LGBTQ+, Black, Asian, Latin American communities), professional categories (e.g., politicians, law enforcement, journalists), and other targeted populations. Threats of violence are defined as statements expressing intent, desire, or encouragement to cause physical harm to individuals or groups. This definition encompasses direct threats, advocacy for violence, and expressions of support for violence against targeted communities.

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⣿ Our Platform Coverage